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From Kofi Annan through Lakhdar Brahimi to Staffan de 
Mistura 
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Thinking About Mediation 
UN mediation in Syria for the decade of the 2010s since the be-
ginning of the Arab Spring in 2011 has failed because the con-
flict was not ripe. To arrive at that evaluation, one has to 
understand the basic challenges a mediator faces and the paths 
followed by the three UN mediators, Kofi Anan, Lakhdar 
Brahimi, and Stafan de Mistura.2  Five basic challenges—
agency, entry, strategy, leverage, inclusivity—confront a medi-
ator on the pursuit of his/her efforts, and will be used as the 
framework for the following analysis.  These challenges have 
been identified because they encompass the major parameters of 
the mediation process. They correspond to several headings em-
phasized in the UN Guidance for Effective Mediation3 and high-
light principal obstacles in the cardinal variables— actors 
(agency, inclusivity), structure (entry), process (leverage), strat-
egy, and outcome—used in negotiation analysis.4 
 
Agency. The mandate of the mission is set by the author-
izing agency.5 The spectrum runs between full freedom to medi-
ate and full backing from appropriate authorities, to a very 
restrictive mandate that requires the mediator to return home to 
cultivate support at each juncture.  At the same time, the mandate 
is a two-way street; it commits the granting agency to support 
the designated mediator by endorsing and implementing his re-
sults, both collectively and as individual members.  The media-
tor is an intermediary both between conflicting parties and also 
between the parties and the mandating source, but the latter has 
a responsibility to support his work. 
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Inclusivity. The parties in the conflict on all three levels-- 
parties, patrons and powers--should be parties to the negotiation 
of a solution.6  If they persist as spoilers and refuse to be part of 
the solution, they can be excluded only if they are not strong 
enough to upset the agreement among others.  
 
Strategy.  With the goal defined, the mediator has to con-
sider how it is to be achieved, and most notably the relation be-
tween the procedural requirement of ending violence (conflict 
management--CM) and the need for a substantive formula for 
handling the conflict issues (conflict resolution--CR). Specifi-
cally, does the mediator manage the conflict with a ceasefire and 
disengagement first and then perhaps turn to seek a settlement, 
or does the mediator work on a resolving agreement which 
would give a reason for ceasing violence and then, or in the pro-
cess, install a ceasefire.  
Each has its logic:  Putting ceasefire and disengagement 
before resolution argues that the parties need to have fully ab-
stained from violence before they can talk peace. Examples are 
Northern Ireland, the Liberian civil war, Bosnia, Sri Lanka, and 
Darfur. The problem is that early ceasefires rarely hold without 
some parallel movement toward resolution and are an if-and-on 
process, so that a requirement of total abstinence may prevent 
peace talks.7 Ceasefires between Israel and Hamas in 2008, 
2012, and 2014, mediated by Egypt, were their own end; some, 
including Hamas, have regretted the fact that they did not pro-
ceed on toward elements of CR.  Ceasefires in Western Sahara, 
Nagorno-Karabakh and Cyprus have been more or less success-
ful but have not led to CR. 
On the other hand, agreement on an outcome or procedure 
to resolution can be required before violence is ended, so that a 
ceasefire does not come fully into effect until the peace agree-
ment is signed or close to it, and parties know for what outcome 
they are giving up violence. Examples are the 2013-2015 Co-
lombian talks with the FARC, or the 1989-1992 Salvadoran talks 
with the FNLM, or the 1990-1994 Mozambican talks with 
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RENAMO, or the 1980-1988 South Africa, Cuban and Angolan 
talks over South West Africa (Namibia).  The advantage is that 
the parties see what they are ceasing violence for; the danger is 
that the violence may simply overwhelm the peace process.  
 
Entry. The mediator is a meddler, not necessarily wel-
come, and must find a way to be accepted by the parties.  They 
may be looking for a mediator to help them out of the conflict, 
but, if not, the mediator will have to convince them of the need 
for mediation. 8  In the first case of a ripe conflict, both parties 
would be convinced of the impossibility of a one-sided victory 
and would be looking to emerge from a painful situation under 
the best terms. Both the US and Iran were willing to look for a 
solution to the hostage-and-sanctions situation in 1979 and wel-
comed Algeria to serve as a mediator to work out an agreement.  
In such cases there is no victory to be had, both sides are in a 
costly stalemate and feel it, and they looked for a way out.  
On the other hand, when the conflicting parties do not re-
alize their impasse and the burden that continued conflict im-
poses, the mediator must first ripen their perception of the 
situation, either by developing an awareness of the costly im-
passe or by presenting an alternative so attractive in comparison 
with the present impasse that it catches their attention.9 But the 
mediator can push only so far, lest he lose the entry completely. 
It took the efforts of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) behind 
those of UN SESG Jamal Benomar, backed by threats from the 
UNSC, to convince the two sides in Yemen of their need for me-
diation and to bring them to an agreement on Ali Saleh’s depar-
ture from the presidency (in exchange for amnesty) in 2012.  But 
if the hurting stalemate is not perceived and felt by the parties to 
push them to accept mediation, no amount of enticing plans for 
the future can pull them to negotiate.   
 
Leverage.  Although leverage in the common understand-
ing refers to hard power or “muscle”, in reality the mediator has 
little of this type. He depends on the wisdom and appeal of his 
4    POST-UPRISING EXCAVATIONS 
arguments. In the context of negotiation as “giving something to 
get something,” the mediator is a demandeur and thus in a weak 
position.  He rarely has the means to threaten or promise any-
thing substantive and can only warn and predict consequences 
beyond his control or borrow leverage (power) from the context. 
Conflicts tend to come in stacked layers or circles (in Lakhdar 
Brahimi’s language): first among the parties themselves, second 
among their regional patrons, and third among the powers of the 
members of the UNSC.  All three levels—parties, patrons and 
powers—offer terrain on which the mediator can operate in 
search of leverage over other levels and a source from which to 
borrow power.  
These five challenges frame the practice of mediation as 
used by the three successive mediators.  
 
The Unfavorable Mediation Context 
The conflict in Syria is particularly resistant to mediation.10 The 
Syrian regime, made up of hardened Machiavellians, has been 
prepared to do whatever necessary to survive, whatever the cost 
to the country; constituted along neo-patrimonial lines, it would 
find it very hard to share power or to remove the president with-
out risk of collapse. Asad warned: “No political dialogue or po-
litical activity can succeed while there are armed terrorist groups 
operating and spreading chaos and instability.”11 The opposition 
contributed to the intractability of the conflict through its maxi-
malist demands for the “fall of the regime”12 and its unwilling-
ness, whether in the name of a democratic or Islamist state, to 
accept a political compromise. The opposition also lacked cred-
ible leaders who could deliver its consent to any negotiated set-
tlement, being divided between a fractious exiled opposition 
with little legitimacy inside the country and those inside Syria 
who were increasingly fragmented into multiple localized fac-
tions and dominated by intransigent and often warring jihadist 
factions.  
A mediation’s first window of opportunity comes before 
violence becomes too deep and closes as it intensifies mutual 
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hostility; however this opportunity depends on ripeness in pro-
spect, where the parties realize that a precipice is looming 
ahead.13 In the Syrian case, the first opportunity was when the 
Arab League made its efforts in 2011.14  It failed because of the 
inexperience of the mediator, a Sudanese general, and the bias 
of the mediating agency, and because of the ineptitude of the 
ceasefire monitors.  
The last obvious opportunity while violence was still 
somewhat contained was in April-May 2012 during Kofi An-
nan’s mediation. This had failed by July 2012 and violence was 
sharply ratcheted up as the opposition was militarized, with cas-
ualties doubling from 2200 in June to 5000 in August 2012. A 
de facto partition soon emerged, with the front lines fairly stabi-
lized and the turf won by rival warlords compensated for the 
damage inflicted by the conflict. This was the situation encoun-
tered by Brahimi’s mediation mission throughout 2013. Statisti-
cal research15 suggests a hurting stalemate is most often reached 
130 months and 33,000 battle deaths into a conflict; in Syria bat-
tle deaths by far exceeded this in less than half the time (220,000 
by January 2015 according to UN figures). 
A new window of opportunity for a political settlement 
could open only when both sides simultaneously would recog-
nize the impossibility of military victory. Objectively, such a 
“hurting stalemate” appeared to have been reached by at least 
the third year of the conflict as it became apparent that neither 
side could defeat the other, particularly after the battle lines be-
tween regime and opposition-controlled parts of the country be-
came hardened.  Decisive in explaining this was the way external 
intervention fueled the conflict. Each side believed that, if only 
its external patrons provided it with more resources or increased 
their intervention on its behalf, the balance of power would shift, 
allowing it victory. External players continued to provide their 
clients with enough support to keep fighting and avoid defeat but 
not enough to defeat their opponent.16  
The opposition had declared that Asad’s departure was 
non-negotiable but, lacking the means to force it, was counting 
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on Western intervention and would accept UN mediation only if 
it produced regime change. The Western powers showed no ap-
petite for military intervention but saw UN diplomacy as a way 
to remove Asad, whom they had de-recognized in favor of the 
exiled Syrian National Council (SNC) as a legitimate representa-
tive of the Syrian people.17  
On the other side, Asad’s great power backers were not 
prepared to abandon him. On 12 May, 10 June, 11 October 2011 
and 4 Feb 2012, Russia (and China) had blocked Western drafts 
condemning the Syrian government’s repression of protestors on 
the grounds that it did not also condemn outside arming and vi-
olence by the opposition. The Russians saw a Libyan scenario 
unfolding in favor of the US and wanted above all to avoid it. 
Annan’s appointment was a compromise to get beyond this 
stalemate, but the powers agreed to it for opposite reasons: Rus-
sia to allow the Syrian regime to survive and the West to remove 
it. 18 19  
 
Kofi Annan’s Mediation Mission 
Kofi Annan took up his mandate in February 2012 amid many 
indications the conflict was not ripe for a negotiated settlement.  
In Annan’s view, the mission was worth the attempt since the 
alternatives were so bleak: the spillover effects of the crisis 
threatened to de-stabilize the whole region.20  Annan proposed a 
6-point conflict management plan on 16 March 2012 under 
which the Syrian government should immediately cease troop 
movements and the use of heavy weapons, and begin a pullback 
of military concentrations in population centers, permit access 
and timely provision of humanitarian assistance, release prison-
ers, and respect freedom of expression and assembly. Annan de-
livered the plan to Asad but the Syrian government asked for 
clarifications and seemingly wanted to negotiate the plan, de-
spite minor adjustments already made in response to Syrian con-
cerns. Annan aimed to present the regime with two bad 
choices—accepting or rejecting—in the expectation it would 
choose the least bad; while it may not have liked the 6 points, it 
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would not feel it could publicly reject them. Annan submitted 
the plan to the UNSC, which endorsed it on March 21. He then 
successfully enlisted Russia to pressure Asad into acceptance of 
the plan on March 27. He announced the Syrian government’s 
acceptance before it had done so to maneuver it into committing 
to a fait accompli.  
 
Ceasefire: Pincer Move 
Next, Annan extended the plan to a ceasefire. Again, the Syrian 
government demurred on the grounds that the opposition was 
being armed from without; but again Russia successfully pres-
sured Asad to accept. The ceasefire required the government 
make the first withdrawals by 10 April, while the Free Syrian 
Army (FSA) would follow two days later. The regime agreed to 
start withdrawing its heavy weapons but qualified this by assert-
ing that the security forces would not withdraw from cities until 
“normal life” had been restored. It also asserted that “a crystal 
clear commitment” from the US, France, Turkey, Qatar and 
Saudi Arabia to stop aiding rebel fighters was “an integral part 
of the understanding” with Annan.21 UNSC 2042 was passed 
unanimously on 21 April, providing for a UN Supervision Mis-
sion in Syria (UNSMIS) to deploy 300 unarmed soldiers to ob-
serve compliance with the ceasefire.  
In Annan’s thinking, the ceasefire would change the psy-
chology of escalation that was driving the conflict and open the 
door to political negotiations.22 He aimed to catch the regime in 
a pincer movement combining international and, especially, 
Russian pressure from above and renewed mass protest from be-
low. A watershed was the contested massacre at Houla on 26 
May for which UNSMIS blamed pro-Asad forces. The Security 
Council was unable to agree on a response due to Russia’s re-
fusal to blame the Syrian government. In May, believing that its 
flank was protected by Russia and that the international consen-
sus against its use of violence had been broken, the regime re-
turned to use of heavy weapons.  
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Action Group: Creating a Transitional Government  
In response, with the aim of increasing the pressure on the re-
gime, Annan convened the Action Group on Syria, centered on 
UNSC members and excluding the Syrian government and its 
patron, Iran (vetoed by the US).  The Group issued the Geneva 
Communiqué on 30 June 2012, calling for inclusive national di-
alogue on a political transition with all parties represented; the 
shape of a future Syrian state was sketched, including constitu-
tional reform and a multi-party system. To reassure the govern-
ment, it supported the continuity of government institutions, 
including the military and security forces, albeit submitted to a 
transitional government. The reference to political transition and 
transitional justice, including accountability for crimes, was 
bound to be seen as threatening by the regime. At Russia’s in-
sistence, the communiqué did not explicitly call for Asad to go, 
either before or during negotiation, as the opposition had in-
sisted.  
The Geneva Communiqué was not implemented—indeed 
it was not even adopted by the UNSC for another two years—
and as violence continued to increase, the observer mission 
ceased its activities on 16 June. On 19 July 2012, Russia and 
China vetoed a strong resolution that would have applied non-
military sanctions to the regime under Chapter 7 if it did not end 
the use of heavy weapons, withdraw troops from towns and cit-
ies, and implement Annan’s peace plan. This was the last straw 
for Annan and he resigned as mediator on 2 August 2012.  
 
What went wrong? 
Annan blamed the Syrian government’s refusal to implement the 
6-point plan; the escalating military campaign of the Syrian op-
position; and the lack of unity in the UNSC. But leverage to get 
the regime to buy into the plan was lacking, as were incentives 
to divide the regime.  He also had no strategy for addressing op-
position intransigence and no pressure on regional powers to 
stop opposition financing.  Annan had no leverage to bring the 
neighbors into his plan, only persuasion, which had no weight. 
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As a result, he put much effort on the “outer ring” or third level 
of players, the US and Russia, and was relying on Russian pres-
sure on the regime to deliver its acquiescence. 23  While Asad 
would acquiesce in Russian pressure to engage with the media-
tor, he was impervious to influence insofar as the plan put his 
vital interests at risk.  Asad and Putin hid behind each other.  
Annan understood that the Russians were determined to 
prevent a repeat of the West’s manipulation of the UNSC hu-
manitarian resolution over Libya for purposes of military inter-
vention and regime change; hence he tried to reassure them that 
his plan was a genuine diplomatic alternative. “One of my big-
gest disappointments”, Annan recalled, “was on the 30th of June. 
We had a difficult but a constructive meeting in Geneva, to dis-
cuss a political transition. They agreed on a communiqué, but on 
the 19th of July, when the council eventually acted, the resolu-
tion was vetoed by Russia and China.”24 This was a result of the 
US insistence that the resolution had to be given teeth under 
chapter VII. Annan believed chapter VI would suffice and Mos-
cow, would have accepted it.25 UNSC unity foundered on the 
opposite expectations held by the West and Russia for the out-
come of mediation; change of the Syrian regime for the West, its 
preservation (albeit reformed) for Russia.   
The Geneva communiqué, based on Annan’s 6-point plan, 
remained the ideal internationally accepted template for a polit-
ical settlement in Syria that could still be activated if the parties 
were to come, as a result of shifts in the power balance, to believe 
a negotiated settlement is in their interests.26 However, it re-
flected a stage when it was still thought possible to roll back the 
damage done by the conflict and constitute a pluralist settlement 
within a working state.  
 
Lakhdar Brahimi's Mediation Mission 
Lakhdar Brahimi took the reins as U.N.-Arab League Envoy to 
Syria on 17 August 2012 after a long career of mediator in Leb-
anon, Afghanistan and elsewhere for the UN and for Algeria. He 
felt from the start that the mission was impossible but took it on 
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“because the UN cannot resign from its role [just] because crises 
are difficult.”27 Indeed, the conflict had become much more in-
tractable from Annan’s time, as militarization, sectarianization 
and state failure proceeded apace.  
 
Inner Circle Strategy: Reaching out to the parties 
Brahimi began his mission by making contact with the conflict-
ing parties, including Asad, and with the regional patrons, in-
cluding Iranian president Ahmedinejad. His repeated message, 
meant to ripen perceptions of a hurting stalemate (that arguably 
existed objectively), was that “there is no military solution to this 
devastating conflict.  Only a political solution will put an end to 
it. And the basis for such a solution does exist. It is the [Geneva] 
Communiqué.”28 The first meeting with Asad was cordial with 
wishes of success for the mediation mission.  But when Brahimi 
raised the question of his resignation in the second meeting, 
Asad reverted to his claim of elected legitimacy and the incon-
ceivability of stepping aside, and called Brahimi biased.  
Brahimi tried small concrete conflict management 
measures to foster trust and start reducing violence, with a four-
day ceasefire on October 24 marking ‘Id al-Adha with UNSC 
endorsement. The ceasefire was only a framework, with a num-
ber of voluntary provisions, and rapidly collapsed.  In the begin-
ning of 2013, in January and February, Brahimi brought 
government and opposition leaders to Geneva for two rounds of 
peace talks and produced a ceasefire in Homs, again for human-
itarian purposes, but it lasted only a week. 
Since early in his tenure, Brahimi struggled to find a legit-
imate negotiating partner within the diversified opposition, split 
between the U.S.-supported moderate opposition based in Istan-
bul and a slew of more Islamist armed rebel groups plus some 
regime-recognized opposition groups inside Syria. Shortly after 
the foreign ministers’ meeting, on 12 December 2012, the US 
formally recognized the National Coalition of Syrian Revolu-
tionary and Opposition Forces (COS) that Secretary of State Hil-
ary Clinton and Qatar had cobbled together as the “legitimate 
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representative” of the Syrian people. As Brahimi saw it, frag-
mented into hundreds of groups supported by rival external pow-
ers, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, the opposition never 
became a truly national movement, such as the FLN or the Vi-
etcong, which could negotiate and deliver on any agreements 
reached.  According to Brahimi, the Americans' hands in the 
third circle were “tied in knots by their allies” in the second cir-
cle.29 When the Arab League voted to give Syria’s chair to the 
opposition on 6 March 2013, Brahimi felt that the door on the 
second level was closed and with it the chances of mediation, 
and he resigned.  Pressed by all sides, he agreed to stay on be-
cause of the upcoming meeting in Moscow.  
Outer Circle Strategy: Betting on the Big Powers 
Faced with the conclusion that no movement was possible on the 
first or second circles, Brahimi sought movement, as had Annan, 
through the third circle—Russia and the US.30  “We tried the 
outer ring, which is the Security Council, and for me that was 
specifically the Americans and the Russians.” He urged a 
meeting of great power foreign ministers to develop the Geneva 
Communiqué into a full transition plan.  He laid more detailed 
proposals before Secretary Hilary Clinton and Minister Sergey 
Lavrov in Dublin on 7 December 2012, specifying some of the 
steps and timings left imprecise in the Communiqué. It included 
provision for a transition government “with full executive 
power” with no progress on the specific consequences for Asad. 
He followed up the foreign ministers’ meeting with the “3Bs” 
meetings of Brahimi, US Under Secretary of State William 
Burns, and Russia's Deputy Foreign Minister Nicholas 
Bogdanov to try to reach a consensus on which to base a move 
toward a peace conference. Although the meetings proceeded 
cordially, they repeatedly deadlocked on the same issue, the 
status of Asad, and the Russians rejected a US proposal to 
discuss the composition of a transitional government as an 
outside attempt to impose a leadership on Syria. From Brahimi’s 
perspective, both “the Americans and the Russians discovered 
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that their agreement was superficial” shortly after they had 
agreed to it.31 In guaranteeing mention of a transitional 
government, the US thought it had won support for the notion 
that Asad would not participate in any transition, whereas the 
Russians believed the “transitional phase should begin with the 
regime and opposition sitting down together.”32  
Like Annan, Brahimi banked particularly on Russian 
cooperation, since the Russians on occasion intimated 
flexibility. Noting that “Western countries have not realized yet 
how angry the Russians felt about what happened in Libya,”33 
Brahimi hoped that proper recognition of the Russian role could 
convince it to work on getting cooperation from the Syrian 
government. In fact, the Russians maintained that they were not 
inextricably committed to Asad, and that if the opposition “got 
its act together” and a viable substitute emerged, as long as none 
of the Islamist groups would take power, Russia would support 
an interim transition body instead of an immediately negotiated 
outcome.  But, at the same time, the Russians consistently said 
it was not up to them to ask President Asad to leave office: "We 
do not have that much influence over him, even if we wanted."34 
They seemed to want the transition council also to contain 
opposition figures from Damascus, whom the US and the 
opposition derided as Asad puppets. 
Two events provided some impetus to kick-start Brahimi’s 
faltering mediation mission. First, on 7 May 2013 the US and 
Russia appeared to reach a breakthrough agreement during 
Secretary of State John Kerry’s first official visit to Moscow. 
“Something extremely important took place,”35 in Brahimi’s 
assessment: of a declaration of shared interests on Syria and a 
plan for an international peace conference to end the escalating 
civil war, planned for the end of May 2013. For the US, which 
had been lukewarm on the idea of a peace conference, this was 
a major shift.  
It took a second event, the chemical weapons attacks on 
the Damascus suburbs of East Ghouta, to jolt the global level 
parties into intervening in the stalemate. UNSC resolution 2118 
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of 22 September 2013 finally included a formal UN endorsement 
of Annan’s Geneva Communiqué and called for “the convening, 
as soon as possible, of an international conference on Syria to 
implement” the Communiqué.36 37 Just getting the government 
and opposition to the table on 15 January 2014 was an 
accomplishment of sorts and might potentially have allowed an 
exploration of common ground between the two. Brahimi was 
keen that Iran, the most influential force behind Asad, be also 
involved and enlisted the UN Secretary-General’s help. Ban 
issued an invitation to Iran just days before the Conference was 
set to begin, on 19 January, whereupon the opposition National 
Coalition threatened to back out. Ban withdrew the invitation 
under US pressure; the US view was that since Iran had not 
endorsed the terms of Geneva Communiqué, it could not attend 
as a full participant.  
Geneva II: Bringing together the regime and opposition 
Though the Geneva II Conference to be held on 22-31 January 
and 10-15 February 2014 marked the first time the Syrian gov-
ernment sat down with an opposition body, it failed to deliver a 
breakthrough. Yet, on the Conference’s second day, 26 January, 
Brahimi announced one step forward, as the government agreed 
to allow some 6,000 women and children leave the opposition-
held central neighborhoods of Homs, Syria’s third-largest city, 
to which the pro-government forces’ siege had denied humani-
tarian access for more than a year.38  
“I think rather the progress we have made is that whereas 
the opposition and their supporters were saying that there is 
nothing to talk about until Bashar leaves, they are saying now 
that we can talk while Bashar is there,” Brahimi said.39 The gov-
ernment, however, accused the opposition of terrorism and never 
departed from its refrain that the first requirement was to deal 
with the terrorism problem. Brahimi remarked to the govern-
ment delegation: "I'm sure that your instructions were: 'Go to 
Geneva, only don't make any concessions, don't discuss anything 
seriously.'" 40 
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Thus, the remaining days of the Conference bore little 
fruit:41 A second round of talks, reconvening in February, 
quickly collapsed after thirty minutes.42 “I am very very sorry 
and I apologize to the Syrian people,” Brahimi told reporters at 
the conclusion of the talks, which were largely overshadowed by 
yet another round of deep violence and displacement, as 50,000 
Syrians fled the Syrian air force bombardment of the Qalamoun 
area.43 Less than two months later, following the government’s 
announcement that it would hold Presidential elections in June 
2014, effectively terminating Brahimi’s attempts to revive the 
Geneva process, he  tendered his resignation.  
 
What Went Wrong? 
In his twenty-one months as U.N.-Arab League Envoy, Brahimi 
made admittedly little headway, as the conflict continued to spi-
ral. Caught between rival spoilers: Brahimi’s mediation appro-
priately reflected a new realization that the Syrian regime was 
not easily or soon going to go.  
Geneva II failed, Brahimi concluded, because the conflict 
was not ripe for resolution, and he had no leverage to make it so, 
although it did provide an occasion for him to repeat his mes-
sage: devastating conflict, no military solution, political solution 
indicated by the Geneva Communiqué.  In keeping with his view 
that the key to a resolution had to be a US-Russian convergence 
to push their regional and Syrian clients into a compromise set-
tlement, Brahimi pursued the top-down strategy, as had Annan. 
However, “neither Russia nor the US could convince their 
friends to participate in the negotiations with serious intent.”44 
This conflicting assessment of the situation prevented their 
reaching agreement on the details of a transition: the US wanted 
too much, the Russian conceded too little and the mediator was 
caught between the two.  
Ostensibly, the second circle of states offers a field for me-
diation. Because of the Great Islamic Divide and the individual 
ambitions behind it, there was simply no way to bring the dis-
parate middle level states—Iran, Iraq, Saudi, Qatar, Turkey—
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together about a common policy, and the more the Sunni states 
did come together, the more they riled the Shi'i  states.  But be-
cause of the hostility of the Gulfis, who considered Asad an out-
sider just like Qaddafi, Asad would not hear of any such efforts, 
and so they persisted in their divisive tactics.  And because 
Brahmi was seeking a modification of that position, they would 
not hear him. 
 
Staffan de Mistura's Mission 
Staffan de Mistura was appointed Special Envoy of the Secre-
tary-General of the UN to Syria (SESG) in July 2014, not long 
after Brahimi left the post.  In the previous decade and a half, he 
had been Special or Personal Representative of the Secretary-
General in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Southern Lebanon, as well as 
holding various positions in the UN and the Italian Foreign Min-
istry.  He spent the entire first year, including six weeks in the 
field and three months in involved capitals, in consultations to-
ward bringing about the resurrection of the Geneva process, but 
also to “come up with initiatives, even if they are not necessarily 
the most effective ones.”45 He described his approach as “a min-
imalistic, if you want, but concrete and realistic approach, what 
the UN can do at this stage.”46 His three initiatives were all de-
signed to augment the transition process with actions drawing on 
the first, lowest level to circumvent the top level stalemate—a 
representative constitutional committee, substantive informal 
discussion sessions, and local ceasefire freezes.  From the begin-
ning, like his predecessors, he emphasized that there was no mil-
itary solution. “The one constant in this violently unpredictable 
conflict is that neither side will win.”47 
 
The Geneva Process 
The basic charge for the SESG was the pursuit of full implemen-
tation of the Geneva Communiqué, as the basis for a Syrian-led 
and Syrian-owned conflict resolution political transition to end 
the conflict.48 49 In May 2015 he started with a series of in-depth, 
separate consultations with the Syrian stakeholders and regional 
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and international actors.50 Following a year’s attempts by de 
Mistura to establish a ceasefire to serve as the prelude for the 
revival of the Geneva process, the US, Russia, Saudi Arabia and 
Turkey met in Vienna in late October to revive the Geneva pro-
cess through broad peace negotiations rather than local freezes. 
Within a week, the 20 states of the International Syria Support 
Group (ISSG)—which did not include the Syrian government or 
opposition—prepared a set of guidelines, issued as a formal Vi-
enna Declaration on 15 November and endorsed as UNSC Res-
olution 2254 on 18 December, for a conclusive peace process to 
be relaunched by the end of the year. The talks were opened in 
Geneva at the end of January 2016 as the Syrian forces pressed 
their offensive around Aleppo with Russian air support. The 
government declared it would not meet with the “terrorists” and 
Russia said that the opposition High Negotiating Committee es-
tablished at Riyadh in December to meet the government in the 
upcoming talks did not represent the opposition.  The two sides 
refused to sit in the same room together and de Mistura sus-
pended Geneva III at the beginning of February 2016 after five 
days, much as Geneva II had been adjourned by Brahimi two 
years earlier.   
The SESG continued to press arrangements to recover the 
Geneva process. Agreement was finally reached on participation 
in a Geneva IV meeting by February 2017; when it began at the 
end of the month, it lasted a week. The procedures were accom-
plished rapidly enough but without substantive movement, as the 
two sides debated different agendas—the government focusing 
on counterterrorism and the opposition on transition; each essen-
tially challenged the other’s existence, the government consid-
ering the opposition as terrorists and the opposition working to 
remove the government.  Geneva V in April 2017 “saw no break-
throughs—let us be frank—but no breakdown, either,” reported 
de Mistura to the Security Council.51  
The VI Geneva round in May 2017 was the first time a 
joint UN-facilitated meeting of the government and opposition 
invitees in one room occurred, substantively discussing during 
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the whole day among themselves with the SESG.52 53 “All agree 
on the need to de-escalate the fighting and form a UN-sponsored 
constitutional committee… But these commonalities risk getting 
lost, especially in the absence of serious international dia-
logue,”54 Mouin Rabbani, who briefly served as the head of de 
Mistura’s political-affairs unit stated: “The mission became the 
extension of the mission.”55   The SESG discerned incremental 
progress on joint meetings with opposition delegations at Ge-
neva VII in July 2017 at which common positions were 
identified. But he also indicated the government has so far not 
provided concrete thinking on issues in the different baskets, 
particularly on a proposal regarding the schedule for drafting a 
new constitution.  
Nearly two years after the first attempts to put substance 
into the Geneva process, the parties still did not engage in direct 
talks at Geneva VIII on 28 November to 14 December 2017.  De 
Mistura told the UNSC, “The opportunity to begin real negotia-
tion was not seized. A golden opportunity was missed.”56 He 
cited four barriers, all from Damascus: The government rejected 
the Riyadh 2 statement’s condition for the exclusion of Iran and 
for the departure of Asad at the start of any transition period. It 
questioned whether the Opposition delegation was sufficiently 
representative, even though by then it was unified including the 
Moscow and Cairo platforms and the old or renewed Riyadh 
platform. Finally, it added – actually using a video on YouTube 
– that until full Syrian sovereignty was restored and terrorism 
defeated in all parts of the Syrian territory, it was not possible to 
entertain real movement on a constitutional review process or 
elections. “That to me was a new condition,” noted de Mistura.57  
The four objections were reiteration of Syrian positions 
over the years and they signaled that the interparty talks had got-
ten nowhere.  Two and a half years earlier, on de Mistura’s last 
trip to Damascus, he was allegedly told by Syria’s foreign min-
ister that there was no room for external involvement in reform-
ing the country’s constitution.58 Yet, at the end of January 2018, 
de Mistura convened a special Geneva meeting in Vienna to 
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focus specifically on the constitutional basket. “I also continue 
to pursue the convening, naturally, of the further formal intra-
Syrian talks and advancing on all the four baskets of the political 
process in Geneva in accordance with resolution 2254,”59 he told 
the UNSC in February.  
 
New Initiatives 
From the beginning, de Mistura had other ideas to bring some 
movement into the peacemaking process.  He developed three 
different initiatives with a focus on conflict resolution that were 
to occupy his tenure alongside the Geneva process itself. On his 
appointment, he stated “I do not have at this stage—and it would 
be presumptuous to have—a peace plan but I do have an action 
plan. The action plan is based on a bottom-up approach in order 
to do something concrete at the time when everybody seems to 
be desperate about what's going on in Syria,”60 thus reversing 
the level of attack of his predecessors. The option was obvious, 
since the top-down approach had twice failed, but it was based 
on the assumption that the bottom did not depend on the top.  
The first part of the plan was to return to the conflict man-
agement idea of ceasefire that had dissolved at the hands of the 
previous mediators and focus it on conflict resolution, building 
from the local level, specifically using neighborhood ceasefires 
to cobble together wider and wider, and so higher and higher, … 
engulfing the second and third levels from the bottom.  The idea 
of neighborhood ceasefires, or freezes, was focused on the same 
principle as the earlier ceasefire of Brahimi, to protect civilian 
population but also “to build first some political process at a 
local level and then eventually at the national level, to give some 
hope to the local population”.61  It was proposed in a study pre-
pared in the Geneva-based Center for Humanitarian Dialog 
(CHD) by Nir Rosen and was presented to the UNSC at the end 
of October 2014 early in de Mistura’s tenure (Kenner 2014).  Lo-
cal truces had already worked in a few scattered places—Zaba-
dani, Homs, Barzah, Ras al-Ain62—but the envoy wanted a place 
of immense symbolic value, “rather like Sarajevo,” and 
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proposed Aleppo, Syria’s second largest city, despite its frac-
tured opposition and continuing combat between government 
and Da’esh (ISIS) forces.  
In early 2015, de Mistura reported that the Syrian Govern-
ment had committed to suspend all aerial attacks and artillery 
shelling over the entire city of Aleppo for six weeks to allow the 
UN to implement the pilot project of unhindered delivery of hu-
manitarian aid and build incrementally from one district  to oth-
ers.63 64 The freeze plan collapsed in February when the 
government launched a final offensive to starve out and elimi-
nate the opposition enclaves, claiming it had signed on to no 
ceasefire. De Mistura felt betrayed and considered resignation.65   
When later, in May, he condemned the Syrian government for a 
barrel-bomb attack on Aleppo that killed at least 70 people, Asad 
cut off personal contact, the last time that de Mistura  would meet 
with him personally and dashing all hope for agreement on a lo-
cal freeze. In the future, he would be received only by lower-
level officials.66   
The ceasefire, the initial element in the Vienna Guidelines, 
was now in the hands of the upper level of states in the ISSC. 
Co-chaired by the US and Russia, the effort for a nation-wide 
ceasefire began with the collapse of Geneva III in February 
2016. The ISSG immediately moved to reestablish and monitor 
a nationwide ceasefire, reset for the end of the same month.  Af-
ter six months of consultations under resurgent combat, the 
ceasefire was finally accepted for mid-September 2016 by the 
Syrian government and the opposition High Negotiating Com-
mittee, but after a week it was declared inoperative by the Syrian 
government.  
Undaunted, de Mistura turned again to the parties, working 
to overcome divisions among the opposition factions that pre-
vented the formation of a representative delegation. Turkey and 
Russia then undertook the ceasefire issue and achieved agree-
ment in December.  UNSCR 2401 of 24 February 2018 again 
called for a nationwide ceasefire in Syria for 30 days (but not to 
affect operations against ISIS and other terrorist groups as 
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designated by the Security Council). A months later, de Mistura 
told the Security Council that cease-fire had failed.67  It had 
lasted a week. 
The second initiative of de Mistura was again an idea to 
work on conflict resolution with lower level activity beneath the 
transition deadlock. By establishing functional bodies with rep-
resentatives from the two sides to address the matters of conflict 
termination, grouped into safety and protection, military and se-
curity, political and constitution, and institutions and develop-
ment, the blocked formal talks could be circumvented.   As 
proposed on 29 July 2015, the four working groups were to meet 
in Geneva under a UN chairmanship to restart substantive dis-
cussions with the open participation of all Syrian factions and 
eventually become a “fully powerful transitional authority,” as 
endorsed by the UNSC on 17 August.  
The discussions in Geneva turned the four baskets of is-
sues into 12 principles, —rather philosophical ideas— “twelve 
living points that can be further developed as the negotiations 
progresses on the substance,” issued at the end of November 
2017.68   They covered sovereignty and unity, governance and 
democracy, separation of powers and human rights, religion and 
the state, decentralization, measures against terrorism, respect 
for all Syria’s components, full participation of women, right to 
return for refugees, among others. Sessions were convened in 
Geneva in late February 2017.69 However, in September the Syr-
ian government refused de Mistura’s invitation to take part in 
meetings to address constitutional and legal issues;70 the initia-
tive got lost in the attempts to renew the Geneva process and its 
alternatives.  
De Mistura’s third conflict resolution initiative, this time 
within the Geneva process, was on the creation of a Constitu-
tional Committee to draft a new Syrian constitution and eventu-
ally lead to UN-backed elections. After intensive consultations 
with all levels after Geneva V, he said “I believe the time has 
come for the UN to provide specific elaborations on the consti-
tutional and electoral baskets (2 and 3) and how they relate to 
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governance and counter-terrorism, security governance and con-
fidence-building measures (1 and 4) and develop agreed and 
clear modalities for the full implementation of UNSCR 2254, 
and stimulate wider consultations as well.”71 The two institu-
tions emerging from discussions on the constitution-making pro-
cess were to be a Constitutional Commission to prepare an initial 
draft and a National Conference which could oversee a national 
dialogue and refer any draft constitution for popular approval—
as laid out in UNSCR 2254. Keeping a key role in the process, 
de Mistura indicated that “both institutions should have their 
mandate, terms of reference, powers, rules of procedure, agreed 
in UN-facilitated intra-Syrian talks in Geneva.”72  
The constitutional commission was to comprise 50 Gov-
ernment delegates, a 50-member broadly representative opposi-
tion delegation; and 50 Syrian experts, civil society figures, 
independents, tribal leaders and women; a core group of 15 from 
each delegation would act as the drafting committee, to submit 
their results to the larger committee for approval, according to 
the Sochi National Dialog Congress of January 2018 and con-
sistent with UNSCR 2254.  Syria provided its list at the end of 
May, with Russia and Iran’s support; a list was received from 
the opposition a month later, with support from other states.  De 
Mistura convened top level representatives of Iran, Russia and 
Turkey on 10-l1 September 2018 in Geneva when it became 
clear that, unlike the first two lists, “the middle third list — the 
list for which I have a particular responsibility to facilitate and 
then to finalize— was significantly questioned” and issues such 
as chairing, voting and the rules of procedure were left unre-
solved.73   
At the end of September 2018, the Syrian Deputy Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister Al-Moualem met with the Secre-
tary-General and de Mistura to call for a fundamental reassess-
ment of the work that had been done on the middle-third list and 
rules of procedure, as well as on the United Nations facilitation 
role.74   Russia and Iran also significantly questioned the middle-
third list.  De Mistura defended his list at length to the UNSC on 
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17 October 2018. “Before the end of the month I also intend to 
invite the Astana guarantors for consultation with me in Geneva 
and to engage with the small-group countries. In my view that 
would be our final opportunity to put the finishing touches to the 
preparations for convening a constitutional committee. I would 
then hope to be in a position to issue invitations to convene the 
committee, if possible during November.” Of the meeting in late 
October “within the context of the Geneva process,75 he re-
ported, “I intend to strike while the iron is hot and try to move 
the Geneva process ahead in consultation with all concerned.”76      
 
Russian Replacement of the Geneva Process 
In fact, the iron had been heating elsewhere. As the Geneva pro-
cess strained, a competitor arose: Russia and Turkey moved to 
fill the vacuum left by the water treading in the Geneva process 
and two years of pressure provided by the massacre of civilians 
and the stalemate of combatants.   When Russia moved in mili-
tarily to prop up the tired regime with air power on 15 September 
2015, it also sought a diplomatic cover to accompany its efforts. 
While the Syrian government improved its military position with 
Russian help, Russia opened its diplomatic initiative with Tur-
key, soon joined by Iran, by offering Astana in Kazakhstan as a 
“neutral” alternative site to Geneva for the peace negotiations, 
with good offices from the trio. Proposed in mid-December 
2016, the meeting took place with Syrian representatives from 
both sides at the end of the month and declared an immediate 
ceasefire.   A month later the sides met together at Astana IIb for 
an agreement by the mediators to form a joint monitoring body 
to enforce the ceasefire and the preparation of a Russian draft 
constitution. The agreement was reaffirmed in Astana III in 
March and three de-escalations zones—an enlargement of de 
Mistura’s idea of local freezes—in the south, in Eastern Ghouta 
(Damascus), and north of Homs—were established at Astana IV 
in May 2017. Yet by Astana V in July neither the ceasefire nor 
the constitution draft was signed by the two sides, although de 
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Mistura said they were making clear progress to reducing vio-
lence. 77   
The same issues were discussed and a fourth zone was cre-
ated in Idlib at Astana VI in September—with two others in Ifrin 
and Eastern Qalamoun brokered by Russia78—and discussions 
concentrated on working groups on the exchange of missing per-
sons, POWs and detainees at Astana VII in 29 October; eight 
months later “the outcome has been zero.”79  Discussions con-
tinued inconclusively at Astana VIII in December reflecting the 
same blockages as at Geneva.     
Russia then sought to jumpstart the process and convened 
a Congress of National Dialog of some 1500 Syrians from all 
sides in Sochi to initiate the selection of the National Committee 
to draft the constitution mandated by UNSCR 2254. Disputes 
over the delegates to the Dialog ended its session after one day, 
on 30 January 2018, but it did affirm that a Constitutional Com-
mittee should be formed  “of  Government, Opposition repre-
sentatives in the intra-Syrian talks – which means those which 
are facilitated by the UN in Geneva – [and] Syrian experts, civil 
society, independents, tribal leaders and women.”80  It endorsed 
the 12 living principles and called for a list of candidates for the 
constitutional committee of 150 with a drafting committee of 45, 
and recognized the role of the UNSESG as facilitator of the pro-
cess.” The following year was spent in a “marathon of consulta-
tion” to implement the charge, culminating the foreign 
ministers’ meeting of the three supporting states at Sochi (de 
Mistrua 20 Dec 2018).  
Although on a separate track, the UN envoy threw his 
weight behind the talks, saying that they “should be seen as lay-
ing the basis for a renewed Geneva process.”81 “Astana must 
bring forth Geneva and vice versa. That is why the United Na-
tions will be in Tehran and Astana, and provide whatever tech-
nical support it can to what we consider a very important step,” 
he told the UNSC after Astana III.82   On Astana IV, “In my 
modest opinion, Astana produced a promising step — a memo-
randum between the three guarantors on the creation of de-
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escalation zones…[whose] precise areas and ambit will become 
clear only when the guarantors complete the extremely 
important so-called mapping process… We should therefore 
urge together the ceasefire guarantors to address those details 
quickly, diligently and fairly within the time frame they 
themselves stipulated in the memorandum.”83  “From the point 
of view of the sponsors of Astana, de Mistura’s role was to lend 
it international legitimacy,” said Rabbani. “And I don’t think he 
realized that he was basically blessing his own irrelevance.”84 
Yet he continued to work for collaboration between the 
competing processes. In November 2017, before Astana V and 
Geneva VII, both of which he attended, he told the UNSC, “The 
UN team continues to stand ready to provide technical advice, 
whenever and wherever needed. Because we need a success in 
Astana, as Astana desperately needs a success in the Geneva po-
litical process in order to consolidate what we are all trying to 
do. Let’s give de-escalation efforts a fair chance to succeed…”85 
Preparing for Geneva VIII, “the ideal trajectory over the coming 
two weeks would be: progress in Astana [V] on 4-5 July; then a 
further set of joint technical expert meetings with the opposition 
groups in the same week; and then a continued discussion and 
dialogue hopefully among international stakeholders… And all 
this in support of both the Astana de-escalation efforts and the 
intra-Syrian Geneva-based political process. I hope that a com-
bination of these elements would help shape an environment 
conducive for the next round of intra-Syrian talks in Geneva in 
the months to come, and bring us one step forward on the jour-
ney towards our shared goal of implementing the resolutions of 
this Council, in particular 2254.”86 
As the attempts at negotiation continued, he urged a more 
active merger of the processes. After Astana VI, he reported, 
“The Astana effort should be seen as laying the basis for a 
renewed Geneva process… the time has come for the focus to 
return to Geneva, and the intra-Syrian talks under the auspices 
of the United Nations – yourselves. That is the only forum in 
which the transitional political process envisaged by this Council 
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in resolution 2254 can be developed with the Syrian parties 
themselves, with the full legitimacy that the UN provides and the 
backing of the international community.”87  Again, in September 
before Geneva VIII and Astana VII, he worked with Saudi Ara-
bia to unite the opposition delegation, but he spoke more insist-
ently. “The Astana effort should be seen as laying the basis for a 
renewed Geneva process”88  He briefed the Security Council. 
“So the next Astana meeting should focus on putting the existing 
arrangements back on track… you [the UN Security Council] 
have solely mandated the United Nations, […] to advance the 
intra-Syrian political negotiation process for a political solution 
to the conflict – and no one else.”89  
After the Congress on National Dialog at the end of Janu-
ary 2018, de Mistura explained to the UNSC his decision to at-
tend the rival meeting (opening session only, since all non-
Syrians except Russian Minister Lavrov were excluded): “It was 
a carefully considered decision, made after special consultations 
in Vienna with the Syrian parties and with the Russian Federa-
tion — and not just by me, but involving the Secretary-General 
himself, too.  Based on those consultations, the United Nations 
had reason to believe that Sochi would contribute to accelerating 
the Geneva process.”90 “We pressed the Astana guarantors at 
that meeting and before to make progress on the crucial issue, 
which to us, is one of the main reasons we attend meetings in 
Astana,” he told the UNSC in February 2018. 
 De Mistura’s technical team participated in the first meet-
ing of the Working Group on detainees and missing persons that 
took place in Astana in March.; “the issue … was first raised in 
Astana a year ago and, sadly, no concrete progress has been 
made so far.”91 By May “the outcome has been zero.”92  Six 
weeks after the National Dialogue Congress in Sochi, de Mistura 
had not yet received the complete inputs on the pool of candi-
dates for a constitutional committee developed in Sochi, from 
the three guarantors. He reiterated that the government of Syria 
continued to refuse to engage on the committee’s formation, and 
in consultations he raised the possibility of establishing interim 
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arrangements and timelines to begin its work. “We have never 
had for any length of time a nation-wide ceasefire or confidence-
building measures that [had] been asked for in resolution 
2254.”93 At the end of November, De Mistura announced that he 
would step down as SESG for family reasons.94 Astana XII con-
tinued in late April and July 2019, after de Mistura’s tenure was 
ended, and reached no agreement even among the host trio on 
basic issues.95  
 
What Went Wrong? 
Staffan de Mistura was the longest serving of the three Special 
Envoys—four years and four months, more than twice the terms 
of his predecessors combined.  He was persistent, active, imagi-
native, and innovative, and diligently optimistic. He continually 
consulted a wide range of parties—even after he was refused en-
try by Asad; he engaged in rival processes to manage the con-
flict; and he reported comprehensively to the UN Security 
Council, his mandator. He had a number of good ideas, for an-
other context. His “living principles” were like declaiming the 
Sermon on the Mount to the fleets in Caesar’s battle of the Nile.  
Yet the initiatives left a legacy that will be helpful elsewhere, if 
not in Syria.  His constitutional emphasis and the balanced com-
mittee which caused him much trouble are necessary procedural 
steps in the transition process; his local ceasefires can be the un-
dergirding foundation on which a conflict management super-
structure rests; and his informal discussions sessions can air 
ideas and plumb differences that formal debates could not yet 
take on.  But in Syria, they ignored the structure and evolution 
of the conflict.  
De Mistura started with the assumption that neither side 
could win.  Unfortunately, the assumption was not shared by the 
parties.  The Special Envoy seems to have spent little time on 
ripening the parties’ perceptions of their situation, like his pre-
decessors, but instead tried to move ahead working on proce-
dures as if ripeness had occurred.  De Mistura’s initiatives, 
which to varying extents focused on lower level actions to 
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circumvent, assist, or parallel upper level (in)action, fell into the 
same swamp of delay and resistance that characterized the cease-
fires and the Geneva processes.  Geneva was an exercise in re-
peated failure but the alternative process under new ownership 
at Astana, after two and a half years, fell before the same internal 
wrangling among the conflicting parties and their patrons. 
 The Special Envoy never had control of the Geneva-man-
dated process of establishing a Syrian transition, but he at least 
worked within the successive UN Security Council resolutions 
as his appointed assignment.  When an alternative process was 
established, it undermined the Geneva process and left the Spe-
cial Envoy outside of its competitor that was designed to replace 
its inactivity.96  The Special Envoy’s increasing efforts to assert 
the continuing viability and predominance of Geneva and his in-
structions to Astana via the Security Council were sad and des-
perate attempts to reassert control of the process. If Syrian 
obstructionism and refusal to accept any role for either peace 
process in the establishment of a constitution was the insur-
mountable obstacle to any movement, it was made possible by 
the dereliction of the Security Council members to support their 
Special Envoy.  He was sent on a diplomatic suicide mission.
    
Conclusion and Lessons 
What were the techniques, styles, strategies of the mediators 
against the challenges they faced, and what lessons can be 
learned for mediation?  Annan focused on developing the guide-
lines for a way out of the conflict, which were necessarily am-
biguous in order to achieve a consensus even among the limited 
number of subscribers.  Brahimi strove to get them implemented 
and put into practice, which brought to light the very details of 
dispute that had been hidden to achieve passage.  His job was 
necessarily long, and further prolonged by the chemical weapons 
interruption, which paradoxically further strengthened and legit-
imized the regime.  Longer still than the first two combined, de 
Mistura’s activities followed a number of strategies, from 
spreading local ceasefires to pressing for a constitutional 
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committee to reviving the Geneva process many times.  But they 
all fell apart and the new Astana process set up by the spoilers—
Russia, Iran, Turkey—was also stopped short of any substantive 
progress at the hands of the Syrian government they supported.                                                                                                                                                                                  
 
Mandate: The mediators appeared to have broad man-
dates, enjoyed high prestige, and faced no competing mediation 
missions until the end.  Yet the members of the mandating 
agency did not follow through with support for the mediators’ 
efforts.  The mediators’ reaction was to appeal to the UNSC to 
support its own mandate.  Annan set up an Action Group on 
Syria to translate his plan into the Geneva Communiqué; it was 
not endorsed by the UNSC until two years later in a different 
context (chemical weapons), but it became a permanent template 
for settlement of the conflict.  De Mistura pleaded to the UNSC 
to back its own Geneva process against the Astana rival. 
Syria’s ability to obstruct the whole process and to refuse 
to accept any role for either Geneva or Astana in the establish-
ment of a constitution was the insurmountable obstacle to any 
movement and was made possible by the dereliction of the Se-
curity Council members in not supporting the mandate.  Only 
Russia had the means to persuade Syria to accept the all-Syrian 
process organized in the Constitutional Committee that de 
Mistura had worked to set up, and if the Astana process made 
any progress, it was because a mandator—Russia—put its dip-
lomatic weight behind it.  
 
Entry: The fact that the objective conditions of stalemate 
were at no time more than superficially felt by both parties and 
their supporters as a mutually hurting stalemate meant that the 
conflict was simply not ripe for effective mediation, and any 
strategy for ripening it ran the risk of having the ripener declared 
mediator non grata, as happened to all three.  While cultivating 
the parties' perception of a hurting stalemate, mediators must 
keep the ear of the parties, not getting too far ahead or leaning 
too heavily on them. Rather, a stable, self-serving—although 
Syria Studies   29 
scarcely soft—stalemate took hold in which the warring sides 
believed negotiations to be more and protracted stalling less 
costly for them than continuing a war, and the mediator was 
never able to turn entry into participation in the process.   
Annan’s principles failed, in good part because the two 
sides had not yet tested their relative capacities in all out combat. 
Brahimi tried but was unable to shake the various parties’ illu-
sion of military victory, and neither wanted negotiation that 
would require incorporating the other side in a settlement.  
Working through the Great Power sponsors, the mediators were 
only able to drag the conflicting parties “kicking and scream-
ing,” in Brahimi's words,97 to Geneva II to IX.  De Mistura too 
started with the assumption that neither side could win but then 
tried to move ahead by working on procedures as if ripeness had 
occurred.  He tried to walk around the absence of ripeness with 
his “new” approaches and his 12 living principles; as a result he 
lost control of the process.  
As the conflict continued, the Syrian government began to 
have objective evidence that it could indeed win, with Russian 
help, while the opposition continued to cling to the conviction 
that it could not afford to lose, and on that basis continued to 
squabble among itself. While Annan and Brahimi called off their 
respective Geneva sessions, de Mistura did the contrary and pur-
sued six more Geneva sessions with no effect except to keep the 
rival Astana process company.  
 
Strategy: After detailed canvasses of the three levels of ac-
tors, the mediators soon felt that the positions of the first and 
second circles were so firmly locked in that the only level on 
which to operate was the third, on US-Russian relations.  They 
figured that if the interests of the top of the layers could be 
brought into sync and if that layer could be brought to unhook 
its interests from those of the lower two levels, the latter would 
be obliged to come along. However, there was a catch-22 in the 
circle of choices: the outer circle members had their interests in 
not moving, and they were able to hide behind the intransigence 
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of the inner circle parties, who were in turn strengthened by the 
intransigence of the outer circle. They believed the Russians saw 
Asad's course as unsustainable, and sought to convince Russia 
that if it became co-manager of a peaceful power transition under 
the Annan plan, it could preserve the Syrian state and Russian 
influence in it (which is, ironically what happened under differ-
ent circumstances after the three mediators had left).98 Annan 
and Brahimi arguably overestimated Russian leverage over the 
Asad regime (or Russian desire to use that leverage) and the 
course of the Astana process showed the inability of Russia to 
deliver during de Mistura’s tenure.  Asad and Putin were hiding 
behind each other. 
All three mediators used ceasefires in an effort to bring 
some initial flexibility into the positions. As Brahimi explained, 
there are two type of ceasefire—from a war perspective to evac-
uate civilians without affecting ongoing hostilities and in a peace 
perspective to provide a breathing time or space in the conflict. 
Twice (Annan and Brahimi) they saw a ceasefire in a war con-
text as a conflict management action to evacuate civilians; de 
Mistrua’s tache d’huile, or creeping freeze tactic of the second 
type, was to expand islands of peace into large areas but it turned 
into the first type after 2015 and was simply savaged by the Syr-
ian government. The first had a humanitarian purpose, to save 
innocent civilians from being casualties, but also a strategic one, 
to shame the combatants.  The one outcome of Geneva II was 
the Syrian release of 6,000 women and children; for Brahimi the 
measure was a recognition “that you cannot start negotiations 
about Syria without having some discussions about the very, 
very bad humanitarian situation.”99  That fact—or observation—
was recognition of the inherent limits on Syrian shame, and par-
ticipation.   
  Critics who criticized the choice of focus confuse the 
ideal situation with the real context: The parties of the first level 
were locked in an existential perception of the conflict, both be-
lieving not only that they could, but that they had to hold out.  
Asad was not moving, the opposition was at sixes and sevens 
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(literally), and none of the three SESGs had the leverage to move 
either party.  Had Russia not entered the fray in 2015, Asad 
would have been in a much weaker position but would most 
likely hold on as long as he could.  He felt he dare not lose.  
Everyone in the conflict felt it was there for the right reasons, 
and was interested in managing or resolving only on its own 
terms.  
The mediators were also criticized for not leaning on the 
regional powers who gave the parties the resources and encour-
agement to continue the fight. Annan vainly tried to get the Sau-
dis and Qataris invested in his plan; Turkey, although invited to 
the Geneva I conclave, urged its clients in the Syrian National 
Council to reject the Communiqué.  The fact that the succession 
of plans—Arab League, Annan Principles, Geneva Communi-
qué, Clinton-Lavrov, Kerry-Lavrov—were very similar poten-
tially offered the Arab states, the source of the original plan, a 
chance to unite behind the mediator to bring the two Syrian sides 
together.  For multiple reasons, the second level states preferred 
sticking with their clients and so fell prey to the same inaction as 
the first level. De Mistura was able to convince second level 
states, notably Saudi Arabia, to bring the disparate opposition 
together behind a list of constitutional commission members, a 
tiny important procedural step.  
From the point of view of mediation theory, the UN at-
tempts had two faults. A general rule of thumb of negotiation is 
that one should not demand as a precondition what one hopes to 
gain in negotiation. To do so would remove an item of exchange 
for the other party. All mediators urged a relaxation of the pre-
condition that Asad had to go and should have no part in a nego-
tiated settlement before negotiations could begin.  The demand 
was shot down by a precondition from Asad’s side, and the two 
preconditions blocked each other.  De Mistura did not even try 
to break open the block.  
The UN mediation was one of two types: for reconciliation 
and for transition. The aim of the Syrian mediation, in crude 
terms, was to engineer regime change and the replacement of the 
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Asad regime. Strict evenhandedness (Impartiality, Guidance, 
10-11) is required for the first, a certain direction for the second.   
Yet even mediation for transition requires a fair and balanced 
treatment of the parties; Asad did not feel that he received such, 
and he took the efforts to create a realization of a hurting stale-
mate as proof of bias.   
 
Inclusivity:  Inclusivity was a major thrust for Brahimi, 
perhaps more than for Annan or de Mistura.  Inclusivity meant 
all the second and third level factions, or at least those capable 
of disrupting an agreement if left out, but the more parties were 
to be brought in, the more agreement becomes difficult. It also 
meant bringing in Iran on the second level.  The test of inclusiv-
ity is practical: whether any excluded party can disrupt an agree-
ment or whether an included party can prevent an agreement.  At 
Geneva I, the excluded parties on the third and second levels did 
not prevent a useful agreement in the Communiqué but were 
needed to complement it with agreement on the details and on 
its implementation, which even the included parties could not 
agree on.  Through Geneva II until the signing of the Joint Com-
prehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the US was firmly opposed 
to full Iranian participation.  By the time of de Mistura, Iran was 
included in the rival process. 
Since no party really believed that there was “no military 
solution”, it was a mistake to go to Geneva II.  As Brahimi sum-
marized with inside insight, everyone was under pressure to just 
“do something, but we went to Geneva II with very little convic-
tion that it would lead anywhere. The government was clear [as] 
daylight in August that they were only there because of the Rus-
sians and did nothing but parrot the claim that the opposition 
were terrorists. The opposition…didn’t represent anybody; for 
them, getting rid of al-Asad would resolve all issues… The play-
ers still think of military solutions and nobody is exhausted to 
such an extent as to accept a mediator voluntarily, the only thing 
that the UN can offer. It was very different in Taif [on Lebanon 
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in 1989] when the warring parties welcomed any suggestion by a 
mediator because they wanted to end it.”   
All of the UN mediators made busy use of their staffs to 
continue contacts that they themselves were unable to continue 
(in Brahimi’s and de Mistura’s case because Asad refused to see 
them and left contacts to their staffs).  All faced strong dissi-
dence at some point from their staffs, although a common thread 
other than personality is hard to discern. Brahimi had his Nasir 
al-Qidwa, who left in disagreement over approaches.    In his 
first year, de Mistura lost his political director Mouin Rabbani in 
a damaging outburst.100  
 
Leverage:  In this situation, the substantive leverage avail-
able to the mediators over the parties’ positions on any level was 
minimal; the most available was procedural leverage, urging the 
conflicting parties to attend Geneva to defend those positions. 
Media reports continually used the term “urged” to capture the 
means of influence of the mediators. Without the means to 
threaten or promise, the mediators were reduced to warnings and 
predictions. The extremely high costs imposed on the popula-
tion, who remained voiceless and unrepresented, were cited but 
ineffectively.    Annan had no leverage to bring the neighbors 
into his plan, only persuasion, which had no weight, and his suc-
cessors had none either; only states on the other two levels had 
leverage. The lack of leverage took its toll on the mediators as 
well, who took on the job with no illusions. Annan resigned after 
five months, Brahimi after seven and then eighteen months, de 
Mistura was disillusioned at a number of points but persisted 
doggedly with patience and pathos. 
One could argue that engagement with the regime could, 
in principle, have shifted its calculations toward compliance. 
Annan had deliberately framed his initiative as a “Syrian-led” 
political process” to avoid raising a regime defensive reaction 
against encroachment on its sovereignty. To more fully incentiv-
ize the regime to cooperate it might have been allowed more in-
put into the shaping of the 6-point plan. Part of the Annan plan 
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envisioned the regime appointing an interlocutor to negotiate the 
precise nature of the transitional executive to which full powers 
were to be transferred (although Annan himself was such an in-
terlocutor); but discussions which Annan planned as his next 
step were aborted by the Houla massacre. The Syrian govern-
ment could have been invited to Geneva I; not having been in-
vited Asad was not invested in the outcome: he told Annan “it’s 
not my thing. I was not there.”  For Annan and Brahimi, Asad 
refused to discuss any plan that provided for his departure.  By 
the time of de Mistura, Syria refused to involve any foreigners 
in discussion of its future. That ended whatever was left of UN 
mediation.  
In sum, arguably the regime was unshakably committed to 
a strategy of survival and was uninterested in negotiating as long 
as it did not have to. By 2012, it had Russian military support, 
which only grew in the following years.  The diplomatic game 
was played for diplomatic purposes, not to find a solution. As 
Brahimi remarked to the government delegation: “I'm sure that 
your instructions were: ‘Go to Geneva, only don't make any con-
cessions, don't discuss anything seriously.’”101  Thus, getting any 
movement depended on changing the regime’s estimate on the 
chances of holding out, and as their own unassisted ability weak-
ened, that was in Russia’s hands, not the mediators’.  It was Rus-
sia that had leverage, not the UN Secretary-General’s Personal 
Envoys.  Arguably, the US could have had leverage too, if it had 
chosen to use it.  The opposition was bound by a compound fear 
of their opponent: they feared the government’s centralized co-
herence in the face of their own disorder and the government’s 
duplicity in all its past offers of reforms and elections, and so 
were unwilling to run any risks.  Without leverage of his own, 
without support from the mandators, without the means to ripen 
an unripe (and further unripening) situation, there was little that 
a UN mediator could do except urge. The Personal Envoys’ fail-
ure was the Security Council’s failure, and more broadly, in 
terms of its own mission, the UN’s failure. 
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One can propose many alternatives, out of context, and 
many critics have done so. They all run up against the situation 
on the ground, or the mediators’ experiential reading of it, oper-
atively the same thing, which is authoritative. The mediators en-
joyed the highest prestige and a finely-honed sense of 
persuasion.  They cultivated and counted on the Great Powers’ 
felt need for an end to the conflict and they laid out a process 
that could have taken them there.  But the locals did not see it 
that way; they did not and indeed dared not see a process to be 
shared with the other side, and in this view they entrapped their 
patrons.  The mediators urged hard—incredibly hard and pa-
tiently against obvious odds—but deep underneath the parties 
were not interested and their patrons buttressed their disinterest. 
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